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CASTAWAY: NAVIGATING UNCHARTED
WATERS
“[W]histle-blowing is a generous, positive act—someone put-
ting his or her career on the line in order to stop a serious
problem from causing preventable harm to others. Whistle-
blowers are not traitors, but people with courage who prefer to
take action against abuses they come across rather than tak-
ing the easy route and remaining silent.”1
INTRODUCTION
n May 20, 2013, former National Security Agency
(“NSA”) contractor Edward Snowden boarded a flight
from Hawaii to Hong Kong with a massive trove of classified
documents.2 During 2012 and 2013, Snowden secretly compiled
and purloined the cache of documents from the NSA over the
course of a fifteen-month stint as an NSA contractor in Ha-
1. Report of the Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on The Pro-
tection of “Whistleblowers,” U.N. Doc. 12006, at 6 (2009) [hereinafter Whis-
tleblower Protection Report],
https://whistlenetwork.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/omtizgt-report-wb-
doc12006-14sept2009.pdf.
2. Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill & Laura Poitras, Edward Snow-
den: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN,
June 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. The NSA originally estimated that
Snowden stole 1.7 million documents, but Snowden claims that he took far
less and intentionally left a trail of digital clues to enable the NSA to deter-
mine which documents he merely viewed and which ones he actually took;
however, the NSA has still not successfully decrypted this digital trail, which
renders their estimate inaccurate at best and pure speculation at worst. See
Andy Greenberg, Snowden: I Left the NSA Clues, but They Couldn’t Find
Them, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2014, 7:00 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/snowden-breadcrumbs/; see also James Bam-
ford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED at 2,
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/ (last updated Aug. 22, 2014).
Investigators now at least distinguish between the number of documents
Snowden was able to access—the estimated 1.7 million—and documents they
believe he distributed to journalists—a more modest fifty to two hundred
thousand documents. Bryan Burrough, Sarah Ellison & Suzanna Andrews,
The Snowden Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and Light, VANITY FAIR (May
2014), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/05/edward-snowden-
politics-interview.
O
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waii.3 During a prearranged meeting with Guardian journalist
Glenn Greenwald and American documentary filmmaker
Laura Poitras, Snowden made “arguably the most significant
national security leak in American history”4 by disclosing de-
tails about the—at that time—largely unknown mass surveil-
lance programs operated by the NSA, which entailed dragnet
data collection of American citizens.5 Snowden, with good rea-
son, had concerns about the constitutionality of these pro-
grams, which prompted him to take action.6 His concerns alleg-
edly remained unaddressed and largely unacknowledged, de-
spite repeated attempts to voice them to his superiors who may
have been able to effect change by further escalating them
within the ranks of the NSA.7
Only days after leaking the documents to various media out-
lets, Snowden identified himself as the source of the leaked
classified information. 8 The U.S. government promptly re-
3. For the first twelve months of his stint in Hawaii, Snowden was em-
ployed by Dell as lead technologist of the NSA’s regional information-sharing
office, Bamford, supra note 2, at 4, and, for the last three, he was employed
by defense consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton as an infrastructure analyst,
Burrough, Ellison & Andrews, supra note 2.
4. Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National Security
Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’YREV. 281, 281 (2014).
5. See Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Matt Sledge, NSA Releases Edward Snowden Email to Push
Back at Whistleblower Claim, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2014, 8:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/29/nsa-edward-snowden-
email_n_5412579.html (describing NSA’s surveillance programs as “improper
and at times unconstitutional”).
7. Whether Snowden actually raised his concerns within the NSA or not
is a source of heated debates. See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Read the Only Email of
Snowden Raising Concerns the NSA Has Found, PBS (May 29, 2014),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/see-email-nsa-found-snowden-raising-
concerns/. The answer to this question is irrelevant to this Note, however,
because even intra-organization reports of suspected wrongdoing by intelli-
gence community contractors like Edward Snowden do not qualify for statu-
tory protection. See infra Part II.C. Moreover, even if contractors were pro-
tected under the framework of current laws in the United States, the protec-
tions afforded to covered intelligence community workers are, according to
some commentators, illusory: the law merely masquerades as a whistleblower
protection statute because, in reality, it only protects disclosures of classified
information to Congress rather than providing recourse for employer-
retaliation. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
8. Despite journalist Ewen MacAskill’s attempts to convince Snowden to
“remain anonymous,” Snowden outed himself as the source of the stolen doc-
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sponded by filing a criminal complaint against him in federal
court,9 in which prosecutors charged Snowden with three felo-
nies––“theft, unauthorized communication of national defense
information, and willful communication of classified communi-
cations intelligence information to an unauthorized person”10––
the last two of which were brought under the auspices of the
1917 Espionage Act.11 Interestingly, a number of countries with
strained U.S.-foreign relations12 demonstrated a willingness to
uments in part because “he knew there would be inquiries at the N.S.A., and
he didn’t want to put his colleagues through all that.” Burrough, Ellison &
Andrews, supra note 2.
9. Complaint at 1, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13 CR 265 (CMH)
(E.D. Va. June 14, 2013), available at
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/us-vs-edward-j-snowden-
criminal-complaint/496/. The United States also “asked Hong Kong to detain
[Snowden] on a provisional arrest warrant.” Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S.
Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH. POST, June 21, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-
with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-
92547bf094cc_story.html.
10. Complaint, supra note 9.
11. Finn & Horwitz, supra note 9.
12. The government of Hong Kong declined to execute a U.S. order to de-
tain Snowden for technical reasons, including the U.S. government’s failure
to list Snowden’s middle name correctly on the application and the applica-
tion’s request for only his detention, rather than surrender and detention.
Patsy Moy, US Failure to Clarify Snowden Papers Tied HK’s Hands, Says
Justice Chief, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 26, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1268958/us-failure-clarify-
snowden-papers-tied-hks-hands-says-justice-chief?page=all. Some authors
have suggested that Hong Kong’s refusal may have been, in part, politically
motivated, as evidenced by Hong Kong’s request for more information about
“alleged hacking of computer systems in Hong Kong by U.S. government
agencies which Snowden had revealed.” See, e.g., Hong Kong: Extradition
Request Failed to Comply with Law, NEWSMAX (June 23, 2013, 9:13 AM),
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/hong-kong-extradition-
request/2013/06/23/id/511371/. But see Mark D. Kielsgard & Ken Gee-Kin Ip,
Hong Kong’s Failure to Extradite Edward Snowden: More than Just a Tech-
nical Defect, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 48 (2014) (suggesting that Hong
Kong’s grounds for extradition refusal had sufficient legal support). Addition-
ally, “Ecuador initially provided [Snowden] with a laissez-passer (from the
French for ‘let pass’), or temporary letter of passage, requesting a country to
allow a person without other identity documents to cross international bor-
ders.” Owen Bowcott, Is Edward Snowden Stateless and Where Can He Go?,
GUARDIAN, July 2, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/02/edward-snowden-where-can-
he-go. Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa also noted in an open letter that
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help Snowden avoid extradition to the United States.13 The
United States then revoked Snowden’s passport, as he awaited
a flight in Moscow’s Shermetyevo Airport during, his attempted
journey from Hong Kong to Cuba.14 As a result, Snowden re-
mained in the airport for thirty-nine days15 while his asylum
applications to twenty-one nation-states around the world were
processed. 16 Eventually, Russia granted Snowden temporary
asylum for one year, 17 and in August 2014, Snowden was
granted a residential permit that would allow him to stay in
the Ecuadorian government would give full consideration to Snowden’s re-
quest for asylum without considering the mounting political pressure the
United States was exerting at the time. Peter Hart, Washington Post: Let’s
Punish Ecuador (Again), FAIR BLOG (June 25, 2013),
http://fair.org/blog/2013/06/25/washington-post-lets-punish-ecuador-again/.
Given that Correa is “a brash populist leader who loves tussling with the
United States,” Juan Forero, Through Snowden, Ecuador Seeks Fight with
U.S., WASH. POST, June 24, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/through-snowden-
ecuador-seeks-fight-with-us/2013/06/24/2229ad52-dd07-11e2-a484-
7b7f79cd66a1_story.html, few would find it hard to believe that political mo-
tivations were partly responsible for these actions.
13. One author has argued that Russia’s decision to grant Snowden tem-
porary asylum was a revenge tactic, carefully calculated by Vladimir Putin in
response sanctions the United States imposed on Russian officials who were
suspects in the death of a Russian whistleblower who was violently beaten by
prison guards. Zackary Keck, Why Did Putin Grant Edward Snowden Asy-
lum? Revenge., DIPLOMAT (Aug. 6, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/why-
did-putin-grant-edward-snowden-asylum-revenge/. Another scholar posited
that “[r]ising anti-Americanism will strain already tense relationships with
countries such as Russia and China,” Mark D. Young, National Insecurity:
The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of Classified Information, J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y, Summer 2014, at 367, 386, which may explain Hong Kong’s fail-
ure to detain and extradite Snowden as well as Russia’s willingness to grant
him temporary residency.
14. Snowden Remains at Shermetyevo Transit Area as His Passport is Re-
voked, SPUTNIK NEWS (June 26, 2013, 9:51 AM),
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_06_26/Snowden-stays-transit-
area-of-Sheremetyevo-because-his-passport-was-revoked-source-2715/.
15. Joshua Eaton, Looking Back in Anger: One Year of Snowden’s Leaks,
AL JAZEERA (July 31, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/31/snowden-awaits-
leakscontinue.html.
16. Bowcott, supra note 12.
17. Steven Lee Meyer & Andrew E. Kramer, Defiant Russia Grants Snow-
den Year’s Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, at A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/europe/edward-snowden-
russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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the country for another three years.18 Despite permission from
the Russian government to travel abroad for up to three
months at a time, venturing beyond the current safety of the
Russian border would put him at risk of detention and extradi-
tion to the United States by an American ally.19 The risk of
capture and extradition therefore has given Snowden little
choice but to remain in Russia for the duration of his three-
year residential permit.
Once news of the intrusive surveillance programs broke, it
seemed that legislators and the public alike were concerned
with little else.20 President Barack Obama was concerned by
how far these programs reached and the public’s perception of
18. Alec Luhn & Mark Tran, Edward Snowden Given Permission to Stay
in Russia for Three More Years, GUARDIAN, Aug. 7, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/edward-snowden-permission-
stay-in-russia-three-years. If Snowden “extend[s] his stay for one year be-
yond” the expiration of his three-year residential permit, he will become eli-
gible to apply for Russian citizenship. Michael Birnbaum, Russia Grants
Snowden Residency for Three More Years, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-grants-edward-
snowden-residency-for-3-more-years/2014/08/07/8b257293-1c30-45fd-8464-
8ed278d5341f_story.html.
19. In a conversation with Washington Post reporter Greg Miller, a gov-
ernment official speaking on condition of anonymity said that White House
homeland security adviser Lisa Monaco stated, “The best play for us is him
landing in a third country.” Greg Miller, U.S. Officials Scrambled to Nab
Snowden, Hoping He Wouldn’t Take a Wrong Step. He Didn’t., WASH. POST,
June 14, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-
officials-scrambling-to-nab-snowden-hoped-he-would-take-a-wrong-step-he-
didnt/2014/06/14/057a1ed2-f1ae-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html. The
anonymous source added “We were hoping he was going to be stupid enough
to get on some kind of airplane, and then have an ally say: ‘You’re in our air-
space. Land.’” Id.
20. Benkler, supra note 4, at 281. As a result of Snowden’s actions,
Within six months, nineteen bills had been introduced in Congress to
substantially reform the [NSA’s] . . . bulk collection program and its
oversight process; a federal judge had held that one of the major dis-
closed programs violated the Fourth Amendment; a special Presi-
dent’s Review Group, . . . appointed by the President, had issued a
report that called for extensive reforms of NSA bulk collection and
abandonment of some of the disclosed practices; and the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board . . . found that one of the disclosed
programs significantly implicated constitutional rights and was like-
ly unconstitutional.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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them—so much so that Obama addressed these concerns di-
rectly in a speech to the Department of Justice about the re-
sults of his administration’s “broad-ranging and unprecedented
review of U.S. intelligence operations.”21 The President recom-
mended substantial changes to the scope of the NSA’s authori-
ty22 and advocated for changing the rules and procedures that
govern the handling of information once it is collected by the
NSA.23 The judiciary was quick to follow suit and only a few
months later, handed down a decision declaring one of the most
controversial NSA programs unconstitutional. 24 Together,
21. Megan Slack, President Obama Discusses U.S. Intelligence Programs
at the Department of Justice, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2014, 6:44 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/17/president-obama-discusses-us-
intelligence-programs-department-justice. In his speech, the President ex-
pressed concerns about the reach of the NSA’s operations into the private
lives of Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing. See White House Office
of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelli-
gence, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2014, 11:15 AM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-
review-signals-intelligence [hereinafter Presidential Remarks on Intelligence]
(“[T]he same technological advances that allow U.S. intelligence agencies to
pin-point an al Qaeda cell in Yemen or an email between two terrorists in the
Sahel, also mean that many routine communications around the world are
within our reach[, and] . . . that prospect is disquieting for all of us.”).
22. Id.
23. See Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Obama Calls for Significant
Changes in Collection of Phone Records of U.S. Citizens, WASH. POST, Jan. 17,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-speech-obama-to-call-for-
restructuring-of-nsas-surveillance-program/2014/01/17/e9d5a8ba-7f6e-11e3-
95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html. President Obama also described the history
of U.S. surveillance and noted that several events throughout U.S. history
have reminded Americans that substantial liberties should not be sacrificed
for national security. Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21. For
example, he stated, “In the long, twilight struggle against Communism, we
had been reminded that the very liberties that we sought to preserve could
not be sacrificed at the altar of national security.” Id.
24. In December 2013, a judge for the Federal District court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia
ruled . . . that the [NSA] program that is systematically keeping rec-
ords of all Americans’ phone calls most likely violates the Constitu-
tion, describing its technology as ‘almost Orwellian’ and suggesting
that James Madison would be ‘aghast’ to learn that the government
was encroaching on liberty in such a way.
Charlie Savage, Judge Questions Legality of N.S.A. Phone Records, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013, at A1 (citing Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1
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these events signify an implicit ratification of Snowden’s dis-
closures by all branches of the government and the public alike.
Despite widespread acknowledgement of the value in Snow-
den’s revelations,25 the Executive branch (“Executive”), through
various agents, has adamantly repeated that it will not consid-
er granting Snowden clemency for his actions,26 but instead
will prosecute him to the full extent of the law.27
As one of the most significant leaks of classified government
information in recent history,28 the NSA revelations illustrate
(D.C. Cir. 2013). Contra American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that NSA’s phone meta-data collection
did not violate fourth amendment).
25. See, e.g., Zeke J. Miller, Time Poll: Support for Snowden—And His
Prosecution, TIME (June 13, 2013),
http://swampland.time.com/2013/06/13/new-time-poll-support-for-the-leaker-
and-his-prosecution/ (“54% of respondents said the leaker, Edward Snowden,
did a ‘good thing’ in releasing information about the government programs.”).
26. See, e.g., Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Edward Snowden’s Im-
pact, 74-JUL. OR. ST. B. BULL. 19, 19 (2014). Even the head of the task force
charged with evaluating the leaks’ effects raised the possibility of granting
Snowden amnesty in exchange for the return of the remaining undisclosed
documents in his possession. See NSA Task Force Leader Backs Talks on
Amnesty for Snowden, FOX NEWS (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/12/16/nsa-task-force-leader-snowden-
took-keys-to-kingdom/. The White House, however, restated its position that
Snowden will be severely punished for his crimes to the extent permitted by
law. Id.
27. John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Secret Without Reason and Costly
Without Accomplishment: Questioning the National Security Agency’s
Metadata Program, 10 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 407, 407 (2014). (not-
ing that the Obama administration “set in motion a program to pursue
[Snowden] to the ends of the earth in order to have him prosecuted to the full
extent of the law for illegally exposing state secrets”). Conviction for the three
felonies that Snowden has been charged with, see Finn & Horwitz, supra note
9, could land him in prison for up to thirty years. Scott Shane, Ex-Contractor
is Charged in Leaks on N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/us/snowden-espionage-
act.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
28. Benkler, supra note 4, at 281. President Obama acknowledged the
monumental importance of these disclosures during his speech to the De-
partment of Justice on the results of his administration’s review of U.S. intel-
ligence programs. Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21, at 5
(“[A]n avalanche of unauthorized disclosures [sparked] controversies at home
and abroad that have continued to this day.”). Ironically, Snowden’s revela-
tions came only a few short weeks after Obama publicly registered his con-
cern about the need for “a more robust public discussion about the balance
between security and liberty” during a speech to the National Defense Uni-
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the push-pull tension between secrecy and democracy29 that
underlies any discussion about the legality of intelligence oper-
ations. The importance of Snowden’s disclosures is demonstrat-
ed by the fact that Snowden instigated the most wide-scale re-
evaluation of American surveillance operations since the mid-
1970s.30 Yet, attitudes about how Snowden went about making
these disclosures are split,31 and they continue to change as
more information about the NSA’s surveillance programs is
leaked.32 One thing remains clear: had the proper disclosure
channels and statutory protections existed to allow Snowden to
disclose his concerns and have them addressed by the govern-
ment, Edward Snowden would not be a household name.
Every whistleblower 33 protection 34 statute enacted in the
United States has treated intelligence community (“IC”) work-
versity. Id. For more information about the context in which the President
acknowledged the need for more discussion on this sensitive matter of public
concern, see White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the Pres-
ident at the National Defense University, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 2013,
2:01 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-national-defense-university.
29. See generally Mark A. Chinen, Secrecy and Democratic Decisions, 27
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2009).
30. Benkler, supra note 4, at 281.
31. See, e.g., Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21 (stating
that “more robust public discussion about the balance between security and
liberty” was needed, but noting that the “sensational” manner disclosures
were made in has “shed more heat than light” and negatively impacted intel-
ligence operations); Roy Greenslade, Edward Snowden’s Leaks Cause Edito-
rial Split at the Washington Post, GUARDIAN, July 5, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/jul/05/edward-snowden-
washington-post.
32. See Public Split Over Impact of NSA Leak, but Most Want Snowden
Prosecuted, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 17, 2013), http://www.people-
press.org/2013/06/17/public-split-over-impact-of-nsa-leak-but-most-want-
snowden-prosecuted/; RT.com,Most Americans Applaud Snowden’s Exposure
of NSA Mass Surveillance, FINAL CALL,
http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/National_News_2/nsa_snowden_101
503.shtml (last updated June 9, 2014, 9:32 AM).
33. Whistleblowing “refers to the disclosure of wrongdoing that threatens
others, rather than a personal grievance.” Richard Calland & Guy Dehn, In-
troduction to WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THE WORLD (Richard Calland & Guy
Dehn eds., 2004).
34. This Note will focus on whistleblower protections for federal public
sector workers in the United States. While there is substantial legislation
that protects private sector whistleblowers, such statutes are beyond the
scope of this Note.
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ers35 differently than any other federal government employee.
A number of considerations and unique characteristics make
IC workers warrant special statutory treatment, which has re-
sulted in total exclusion from the vast majority of whistleblow-
er statutes in the United States.36 Worse yet, an arbitrary stat-
utory distinction between employees and contractors left
Snowden with no whistleblower protection whatsoever; he had
no recourse against employer retaliation for exposing what he
perceived as wrongdoing. 37 Because the current statutory
framework does not include IC contract workers, individuals
like Snowden do not enjoy even the modest protections from
retaliation that employees of IC agencies do.38 Accordingly, in-
ternally disclosing information he reasonably believed evi-
denced an abuse of power very likely could have been a career-
ending move for Snowden,39 while the perceived abuses would
have continued unchecked.40
35. As used in this Note, the term “workers” will refer to both employees
and contractors.
36. The relevant statutes are the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, the Intelligence Community Whistle-
blower Protection Act of 1988, and the Whistleblower Protection Enhance-
ment Act of 2012. For a detailed discussion of the provisions in each, see infra
Part II.
37. See, e.g., Jon Greenberg, Greenwald: NSA Leaker Snowden has no
Whistleblower Protection, POLITIFACT (Jan. 7, 2014, 11:42 AM),
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jan/07/glenn-
greenwald/greenwald-nsa-leaker-snowden-has-no-whistleblower-/.
38. See Glenn Kessler, Edward Snowden’s Claim That He Had “No Proper
Channels” for Protection as a Whistleblower, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/03/12/edward-
snowdens-claim-that-as-a-contractor-he-had-no-proper-channels-for-
protection-as-a-whistleblower/ (stating that “the [Intelligence Community
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998] is generally regarded as fairly weak”
and noting that Presidential Policy Directive 19, see infra Part II.E., does not
protect IC whistleblowers from retaliation); see also infra Part II.C., for a
discussion of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of
1998.
39. For example, in July 2003, federal air marshal John MacLean dis-
closed to the media the Transportation Security Administration’s plan to
suspend all missions requiring a federal air marshal to stay in a hotel over-
night for over ten days. Jon Knight, Patrolling the Unfriendly Skies: Protect-
ing Whistleblowers Through Expanded Jurisdiction, 20 FED. CIRCUITB.J. 281,
281−83 (2010). The TSA was announced this plan to air marshals only a day
before “intelligence memos [that] showed the greatest threat to airline safety
since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon” were pub-
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As a result, IC whistleblowers41 are forced to choose between
several unappealing courses of action: ignoring illegality, agen-
cy misconduct, wrongdoing, government abuse, or policies in
the IC that warrant blowing the whistle;42 reporting any of
these internally through prescribed channels only to be retali-
ated against; or publicly disclosing wrongdoing at risk of crimi-
nal prosecution.43 Faced with these choices and “[w]ithout pro-
tected channels for exposing wrongdoing, some national securi-
ty and [IC] members who were unwilling to remain silent have
taken huge personal risks to expose wrongdoing.”44
Unfortunately for an IC contractor in this position, disclosing
information about perceived misconduct will most likely result
in prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917, at least under
the Obama administration.45 The lack of adequate protections
lished on the front page of the Washington Post. Id. (citing Sarah Kehaulani,
Memo Warns of New Plots to Hijack Jets, WASH. POST, July 30, 2003, at A1).
MacLean was later fired on several grounds, despite voicing his concerns to
his supervisor and the Office of the Inspector General, both of whom failed to
investigate the well-founded concerns, before turning to the media. MacLean
had no recourse for his termination—normally, a prohibited personnel prac-
tice that whistleblowers are protected from—because he was an intelligence
community employee. Id. Similarly, in 2010, when NSA employee Thomas
Drake attempted to blow the whistle by “follow[ing] the Intelligence Commu-
nity Whistleblower law to a ‘T’,” Greenberg, supra note 37, he became the
suspect of a four year federal investigation and was charged with multiple
felonies that ultimately failed to stick, see Kessler, supra note 38.
40. See, e.g., Jenny Mendelsohn, Note, Calling the Boss or Calling the
Press: A Comparison of British and American Responses to Internal and Ex-
ternal Whistleblowing, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 723, 723 (2009) (“A
potential whistleblower faces a difficult choice: she can either stick her neck
out and report misconduct, risking potential retaliation from her employer, or
she can keep quiet, keep her job and keep her employer’s misconduct hid-
den.”).
41. In this Note, “IC whistleblowers” will refer to any employee of or work-
er contracted by an Executive agency which has, as its principal function, the
conduct of foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence operations.
42. This note will use “misconduct,” “wrongdoing,” “government abuse,”
and similar words interchangeably to refer to misconduct that warrants dis-
closure to an employer, a third party, or a public outlet such as the media.
43. Arden Arnold, Does New Policy Protect Intelligence Whistleblowers?,
POGO BLOG (July 10, 2013), http://www.pogo.org/blog/2013/07/20130710-does-
new-policy-protect-intelligence-whistleblowers.html.
44. Id.
45. Under the Obama administration, eight individuals have been charged
for leaks under the Espionage Act of 1917, while only three Americans in
history previously suffered the same fate. See Cora Currier, Charting
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for IC whistleblowers and the government’s unwavering dedi-
cation to prosecuting disclosers of questionably classified in-
formation both undermines the stated purpose of current whis-
tleblower statutes and criminalizes individuals who disclose
perceived wrongdoing with a good faith belief that doing so will
end the abuses. Additionally, it creates perverse incentives for
countries with soured U.S.-foreign relations to harbor and
grant asylum to individuals who possess sensitive national se-
curity information that could pose a grave risk of imminent
harm to American national security.46
While the United States is among the countries with the
most robust whistleblower protections in the world,47 these pro-
tections could be improved by expanding them to cover all IC
workers. Providing proper, protected channels for IC workers
to disclose wrongdoing would reduce the number of public dis-
closures of classified national security information; increase
disclosures to designees best situated to remedy well-founded
Obama’s Crackdown on National Security Leaks, PRO PUBLICA (July 30, 2013,
3:40 PM), http://www.propublica.org/special/sealing-loose-lips-charting-
obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks, archived at
http://perma.cc/L2CZ-CRCW. For background information on the three indi-
viduals prosecuted for leaks prior to President Obama’s initial election, see
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 455 n.17 (2014). Papan-
drea hypothesizes that “[t]he primary causes of the dramatic increase in
prosecutions are likely changes in technology and the media, exploding
growth of and access to classified information, and a belief that it is especially
important in a war against terrorists to protect our secrets vigilantly.” Id.
46. This concern was echoed by the NSA, which was so concerned about
the documents Snowden stole falling into the hands of the Russians and Chi-
nese that they considered granting Snowden amnesty at one time. See Spen-
cer Ackerman, NSA Officials Consider Edward Snowden Amnesty in Return
for Documents, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/15/nsa-edward-snowden-
amnesty-documents.
47. See, e.g., THAD M. GUYER & NIKOLAS F PETERSON, THE CURRENT STATE
OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAW IN EUROPE: A REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 7 (2013),
http://whistleblower.org/sites/default/files/TheCurrentStateofWhistleblowerL
awinEurope.pdf (describing the U.S. whistleblower protection regime as
“comprehensive” in comparison to the EU’s largely ineffective “patchwork”
protections) (citing PAUL STEVENSON & MICHAEL LEVI, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
THE PROTECTION OFWHISTLEBLOWERS: A STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A LEGAL
INSTRUMENT ON THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES WHO MAKE DISCLOSURES IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 12 (2012))
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reports of wrongdoing; and bolster national security by pre-
venting sensitive from falling into political enemies’ possession.
Ultimately, expanding whistleblower protections to protect all
IC workers would reserve use of the 1917 Espionage Act for its
intended purpose48 and make a significant stride toward ac-
complishing Congress’s stated purposes in enacting whistle-
blower statutes.49 This Note explores ways in which the U.S.
whistleblower statutes could be enhanced by expansion to cover
IC workers and proposes a suggestion for such expansion by
taking cues from the United Kingdom’s whistleblower protec-
tion statute.
Part I of this Note discusses the relevant background of IC
whistleblowing under U.S. law, noting the important function
that whistleblowing serves. This discussion also describes the
inherent difficulties in designing a statute that provides ade-
quate protections without risking excessive disclosure and in-
advertent harm to national security. Part II explores the histo-
ry of whistleblower statutes in the United States and provides
a detailed description of the current statutory framework. Ad-
ditionally, it criticizes the current state of the U.S. whistle-
blower protection laws and enumerates their widely-recognized
shortcomings. Part III first discusses the United Kingdom’s
whistleblower protection statute. Part III further proposes
comprehensive statutory reforms in the United States based on
the United Kingdom’s whistleblower protection statute and
acknowledges that the U.K model would be more effective in
the comparatively small cohort of IC workers than it has been
with the entire U.K. population. Finally, Part III expounds up-
on how these recommendations would improve the protections
currently afforded IC workers by U.S. whistleblower protection
laws.
48. The 1917 Espionage Act is “[a]n Act to punish acts of interference with
foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the Unites
States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the criminal laws of the
United States.” Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. 65-24, pmbl., 40 Stat. 217, 217
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 793).
49. E.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16
(1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (“The purpose of
this Act is to strengthen and improve protection for the rights of Federal em-
ployees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing within the
Government.” (emphasis added)). For more examples of Congress’s stated
purposes in enacting whistleblower protection statutes, see infra Part II.
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I. BACKGROUND
“Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a lit-
tle temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”50
Drafting a law that adequately deals with the issue of whis-
tleblowing in the intelligence community is difficult, first, be-
cause there is widespread disagreement about how such indi-
viduals should be treated. While there has been a general trend
toward enhancing the federal government’s treatment of whis-
tleblowers in recent years, IC whistleblowers are “[t]he [g]reat
[e]xception” to that rule.51 This is partially due to the polarizing
nature of cases involving IC whistleblowing: 52 strong opinions
arise out of concerns over the hot-button issue of national secu-
rity.53 Perhaps unsurprisingly, public reactions to actions like
Snowden’s cannot even be predicted along party lines.54 A sin-
50. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, in
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 19−21 (1756),
available at
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=6&page=238a.
51. Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The Na-
tional Security Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 72–89 (2012).
52. Recently, a number of high-profile cases have demonstrated the divi-
siveness that IC whistleblowing engenders. For example, the story of Chel-
sea—formerly Bradley—is probably still fresh in the mind of most Americans.
As a result of his attempt to “show the true cost of war,” Amy Goodman &
Juan Gonzalez, WikiLeaks Whistleblower Bradley Manning Says He Wanted
to Show the Public the “True Cost of War,” DEMOCRACY NOW! (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/2013/3/1/wikileaks_whistleblower_bradley_ma
nning_says_he, Manning was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison after
being convicted for seventeen of twenty-two charges for leaking hundreds of
thousands of diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks, Julie Tate, Bradley Manning
Sentenced to 35 Years in WikiLeaks Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-
bradley-manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-b87c-
476db8ac34cd_story.html. While many called for his imprisonment, others
rallied and protested in support of Manning’s cause, labelling him a hero and
a martyr.
53. See Adam Edelman, Edward Snowden, Hero or Traitor? NSA Leaker
Divides Political World in Sometimes Unpredictable Ways, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(June 11, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/edward-snowden-
hero-traitor-nsa-leaker-divides-political-world-sometimes-unpredictable-
ways-article-1.1369586.
54. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Liability for Massive Online Leaks of Na-
tional Defense Information, 48 GA. L. REV. 873, 894 (2014) (“For those who
leak government secrets for altruistic motives, the public perception of their
justification is likely to be divided and controversial.”).
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gle whistle blower may be called a hero by some and a traitor
by others.55 Not only has the media engaged in this political
“name game,” in which the accused is referred to by various
names that each carry their own “connotations of righteousness
and wrongdoing,”56 but President Obama has similarly adopted
a wide range of rhetoric to refer to different disclosures depend-
ing on his judgment of each.57 Given this lack of consensus
about how such individuals should be treated, it is no surprise
that current whistleblower protection statutes do not adequate-
ly protect IC workers and that comprehensive reforms are still
needed.
Drafting legislation on this issue is further complicated by
the fact that a whistleblower protection statute must mount
the difficult task of striking an appropriate balance between
the equally important but competing interests of security and
democracy, which “coexist with one another in a precarious,
ever-shifting state of balance that security concerns threaten
constantly to upset.” 58 Striking the appropriate balance be-
55. Id. (“There are those who regard Daniel Ellsberg or Edward Snowden
as cultural heroes, and those who regard them as pariahs.”). See generally
Papandrea, supra note 45 (questioning whether individuals like Chelsea—
formerly Bradley—Manning and Edward Snowden are traitors, spies, or
whistleblowers).
56. See, e.g., Katy Steinmetz, The Edward Snowden Name Game: Whistle-
Blower, Traitor, Leaker, TIME (July 10, 2013),
http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/07/10/the-edward-snowden-name-game-
whistle-blower-traitor-leaker, archived at http://perma.cc/9S98-EZV3.
57. Obama has referred to what he deems to be valuable disclosures as
instances of “whistleblowing,” while he has described disclosures of national
security information as “leaks.” Moberly, supra note 51, at 73–75. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, when confidential information is leaked to the benefit of the
government, it is a routine matter for the leaker to go unpunished. For more
information on the contradictory practice of permitting strategic government
leaks, see generally David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Govern-
ment Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127
HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). Pozen notes that “[c]lassified information disclo-
sures to the media are thought to occur so regularly in Washington as to con-
stitute a routine method of communication about government.” Id. at 528
(internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted).
58. Benjamin Wittes, Against a Crude Balance: Platform Security and the
Hostile Symbiosis Between Liberty and Security, BROOKINGS AND HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL PROJECT ON LAW AND SECURITY (Sept. 21, 2001),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/21-platform-security-
wittes. See also Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21 (“Those
who are troubled by our existing programs are not interested in a repeat of
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tween “defend[ing] our nation and uphold[ing] our civil liber-
ties,” however, is complicated by the imperative that intelli-
gence agencies operate under a veil of secrecy: by definition,
the result is that any such agency is less accountable to the
people.59 Therefore, while the Executive must be granted ade-
quate authority—including the right to keep certain infor-
mation secret60 and conduct certain operations in secret—to
ensure national security,61 that grant must not be so expansive
as to make the Executive’s decision making unaccountable to
the people.62
The Constitution manifestly grants the Executive the sole
power to ensure and maintain national security,63 and an inte-
gral component of the Executive’s duty to protect the Nation’s
security is the discretion to classify documents and infor-
9/11, and those who defend these programs are not dismissive of civil liber-
ties. The challenge is getting the details right, and that’s not simple.”).
59. See Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21.
60. See, e.g., id. (“[I]ntelligence agencies cannot function without secrecy.”).
61. In a 2001 memorandum to the President, the Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel stated
[T]he President’s constitutional power to defend the United States
and the lives of its people must be understood in light of the Found-
ers’ express intention to create a federal government “cloathed with
all the powers requisite to [the] complete execution of its trust.”
Foremost among the objectives committed to that trust by the Con-
stitution is the security of the Nation. As Hamilton explained in ar-
guing for the Constitutional’s adoption, because “the circumstances
which may affect the public safety are [not] reducible within certain
determinate limits, . . . it must be admitted, as a necessary conse-
quence that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to
provide for the defense and protection of the community in any mat-
ter essential to its efficiency.”
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to the Deputy Counsel to the President on the President’s Constitu-
tional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Na-
tions Supporting Them 2 (Sept. 25, 2001) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at
122 (Alexander Hamilton)) (on file with author).
62. A noted scholar described this power as the “vast and largely un-
checked control the executive branch enjoys over national security infor-
mation.” Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The
Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 237 (2008).
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be commander in
chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.”).
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mation. As a result, national security decision making, includ-
ing decisions regarding classification, is generally not subject to
judicial review 64—one of the many important and effective
power checks that exist in the American political machine. Ac-
cordingly, commentators have argued that Executive has es-
sentially unbridled discretion to classify national security in-
formation as it sees fit.65 However, a critical component to the
core of democratic society is allowing the public to access gov-
ernment information; but access is limited when the Executive
classifies information.66 Concededly, procedures must exist to
keep certain information confidential and to maintain an ade-
quate level of Executive secrecy.67 And while this should not be
misconstrued as a metaphorical blank check for the Executive,
it is generally treated as such: the government systematically
over-classifies information.68
64. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and
as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services
whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret.”); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972) (“If
in the conduct of its operations the need for secrecy requires a system of clas-
sification of documents and information, the process of classification is party
of the executive function beyond the scope of judicial review.”); Ctr. for Nat.
Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“We there-
fore reject any attempt to artificially limit the long-recognized deference to
the executive on national security issues.”). Furthermore, “[i]t is within the
role of the executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting na-
tional security. It is not within the role of the courts to second-guess execu-
tive judgments made in furtherance of that branch’s proper role.” Id. at 932.
65. Papandrea, supra note 62, at 236. Papandrea further states that
“[a]lthough the Freedom of Information Act and whistleblower protection
laws serve as checks on the executive’s power over information, these checks
are largely ineffectual in the context of national security information.” Id.
66. Pamela Takefman, Note, Curbing Overzealous Prosecution of the Espi-
onage Act: Thomas Andrews Drake and the Case for Judicial Intervention at
Sentencing, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 897, 901 (2013). Takefman indicates that
“[e]xperts have recognized that government agencies withhold too much in-
formation from the public by classifying documents when there is no real
threat to national security therein.” For a brief synopsis of support for Take-
fman’s assertion, see the accompanying explanatory text in footnote 17 of her
article.
67. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (2010).
68. According to Rodney Smolla, “the government engages in massive over-
classification of materials, undermining fundamental values of transparency
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This further complicates the issue of how to treat IC whistle-
blowers because publicly disclosing classified information is
prohibited by law, and under the current statutory framework,
a disclosure is not protected if it is “prohibited by law.”69 There-
fore, even if IC workers were adequately protected by the cur-
rent U.S. whistleblower protection statutes, many disclosures–
–including the ones Edward Snowden made––would be unpro-
tected given the amount of information that is wrongfully clas-
sified. 70 In such cases, by not protecting and often prosecuting
IC whistleblowers, 71 the government effectively muzzles the
“public dialogue” sparked by whistleblowing that is necessary
to “hold the government accountable for its actions.”72 Absent
and accountability essential to a healthy well-functioning democracy.” Rod-
ney A. Smolla, supra note 54, at 875 (citing Steven Aftergood, Reducing Gov-
ernment Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 403
(2009) (“When asked how much defense information in government is over-
classified or unnecessarily classified, former Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence Carol A. Haave told a House subcommittee in 2004 that it could
be as much as fifty percent, an astonishingly high figure.”)). See also III. In-
formation Security: Classification of Government Documents, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1189, 1201 (1972) (“I have read and prepared countless thousands of
classified documents. In my experience, 75 percent of these documents should
never have been classified . . . ; another 15 percent quickly outlived the need
for secrecy; and only about 10 percent genuinely required restricted access
over any significant period of time.”). Often, such information has little to
with national security, and instead it merely protects illegal or embarrassing
government actions from public scrutiny. For a detailed discussion about “il-
legal secrets,” i.e., maintaining the secrecy of illegal government action
through classification, see Jenny-Brooke Condon, Illegal Secrets, 91 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1099 (2014).
69. If an IC employee makes a qualifying disclosure (i.e., the right type of
information was made to one of a number of legally appropriate parties), he
or she is entitled to whistleblower protection unless “such disclosure is . . .
specifically prohibited by law” or the disclosed information “is specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national de-
fense or the conduct of foreign affairs.” 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1). Because disclo-
sure of the lion’s share of information or conduct that IC workers have access
to and observe is “prohibited by law,” this requirement effectively renders
almost all potential IC whistleblowers unprotected.
70. Papandrea, supra note 45, at 490 (“[N]ational security whistleblowers
have little shelter from retaliation, and the judicial branch has no authority
to review any retaliation claims they might have. As a result, the executive
branch has virtually unchecked authority to declare what information is se-
cret and to punish leakers as it sees fit.” (footnotes omitted)).
71. Currier, supra note 45.
72. Takefman, supra note 66.
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IC whistleblowers like Snowden who disclose wrongdoing to
the media, the public would otherwise have no access to infor-
mation that may have been improperly classified.73
When democratic accountability is lacking, “the danger of
government overreach becomes more acute.”74 Accordingly, un-
bridled Executive national security decision-making power in-
evitably does lead to government overreaching—and the NSA
scandal is a visceral illustration of that startling, yet unsur-
prising, reality. As one scholar noted,
[u]nless one believes that the national security establishment
has a magical exemption from the dynamics that lead all oth-
er large scale organizations to error, then whistleblowing
must be available as a critical arrow in the quiver of any de-
mocracy that seeks to contain the tragic consequences that
follow when national security organizations make significant
errors or engage in illegality or systemic abuse.75
However, given the vital importance of national security,
wrongdoing and misconduct must be promptly identified and
adequately redressed,76 which is precisely one of the functions
whistleblowing serves.
Not only has the ability of intelligence agencies like the NSA
to conduct operations shrouded in secrecy enabled Executive
power abuses, but rapid technological innovation has also ena-
bled intelligence agencies to conduct operations on a scale pre-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Benkler, supra note 4, at 285.
76. Id. at 290 (citing JOHNHAMPDEN JACKSON, CLEMENCEAU AND THE THIRD
REPUBLIC 228 (1946)). At length, Benkler explained,
[F]or national security, current law protects secrecy at the expense of
external review, even at the cost of securing bureaucratic independ-
ence from democratic accountability. The facially obvious reason is
that revealing information that the national security establishment
deems secret can have negative consequences such that the benefits
of disclosure, generally thought worthwhile in less life-critical con-
texts than national security, do not in this context outweigh the costs
of error, incompetence, and malfeasance within the system. Once
stated in this form, the obvious counterargument emerges. To para-
phrase Clemenceau, national security is too important to be left to
national security insiders.
Id. at 289.
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viously not thought possible.77 However, as a world leader in
technological innovation, the United States is held to a higher
standard by the rest of the world, which not only expects, but
demands, that the digital information age usher in an era of
“individual empowerment” rather than one of “governmental
control.” 78 It is therefore imperative to implement power-
checking mechanisms––other than public transparency, which
would eliminate the secrecy that is necessary for the conduct of
intelligence operations––to enhance government accountability
with respect to national security decision making.79
Whistleblowing is one such mechanism that could effectively
check the Executive’s broad power to make national security
77. See, e.g., Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21. Presi-
dent Obama explained,
When you cut through the noise, what’s really at stake is how we
remain true to who we are [as a nation] in a world that is remaking
itself at dizzying speed. Whether it’s the ability of individuals to
communicate ideas; to access information that would have once filled
every great library in every country in the world; or to forge bonds
with people on other sides of the globe, technology is remaking what
is possible for individuals, for institutions, and for the international
order.
Id.
78. Id.
79. NSA General Counsel Rajesh De asserted the following:
There is no doubt that in a democracy like ours, an important form
of accountability is public transparency. However, it is absolutely es-
sential not to assume that the legitimacy afforded by public trans-
parency is the only way to achieve accountability, which may—in
fact, must with respect to NSA—primarily be achieved through al-
ternate means. There is no perfect substitute for public transparency
in a democracy; but when there is also no way to provide information
to those whom you seek to protect without also providing it to those
from whom you seek to protect them, we must largely rely on such
alternate means of accountability.
Rajesh De, General Counsel, National Security Agency, The NSA and Ac-
countability in an Era of Big Data, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 301, 308
(2014) (emphasis added). Others, however, have noted the difficulty that is
part and parcel of ensuring accountability in this context. Walter F. Mondale
et al., National Security and the Constitution: A Conversation Between Walter
F. Mondale and Robert Stein, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2011, 2013 (2014) (“The great
challenge in the conduct of our classified intelligence operations is that it is
very difficult, and sometimes almost impossible, to ensure the accountability
envisioned in our Constitution.”).
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decisions in its sole discretion.80 Absent judicial review, the ac-
countability-enhancing function that whistleblowing serves in
the realm of national security and the IC are integral to main-
taining governmental integrity.81 Given the current limitations
of IC whistleblower protection, broadening the coverage of
these statutes is a necessity. Whether any individuals brought
within the coverage of a statute that has broader protections
“blow the whistle” or not, that protection for would-be whistle-
blowers itself is a robust mechanism for preventing abuses. If a
constant threat exists that wrongdoing may be legally dis-
closed, greater caution will inform governmental decision mak-
ing.82
By the same token, an over-broad expansion of IC whistle-
blower protections creates a serious risk that classified infor-
mation will be inadvertently revealed to the material detriment
of U.S. national security.83 The clarity with which mid- and
low-level intelligence analysts understand the potentially far-
reaching implications of a given disclosure of classified infor-
mation is limited by the breadth of information that their secu-
rity clearances allow them to access.84 Accordingly, a statute
80. Papandrea, supra note 62, at 244 (“[F]ederal whistleblower statutes
are [one] mean[] by which Congress has attempted to provide a check on the
executive branch’s natural tendency to be excessively secretive.”).
81. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., G20 ANTI-
CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS para. 1 (2011)
[hereinafter 2011 G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN],
http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/48972967.pdf.
82. Candice M. Kines, Note, Aiding the Enemy or Promoting Democracy:
Defining the Rights of Journalists and Whistleblowers, 116 W. VA. L. REV.
739, 779 (2013) (“[A]s long as the executive branch understands that any in-
formation may be disclosed to the public at any time, it is likely that it will
engage in national security decision making more carefully. . . [T]he govern-
ment will be forced to balance what is best for the public good.”). But see El-
letta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S.
Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 908
(2004) (asserting that empirical research undercuts the seemingly intuitive
proposition that protecting whistleblowers from retaliation will induce indi-
viduals to disclose observed wrongdoing and that providing affirmative incen-
tives, e.g., financial rewards for substantiated claims, is a superior alterna-
tive means to enhance accountability and transparency through whistleblow-
ing).
83. See, e.g., Kines, supra note 82, at 770 (“Overall, prevention of harmful
disclosure is necessary to protect national security.”).
84. See, e.g., Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21 (“[T]he
sensational way in which these disclosures have come out has often shed
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that defers to the judgment of all IC workers and protects them
from retaliation for making any public, external disclosures of
perceived wrongdoing is too broad and may harm national se-
curity.85
This is not to say that such disclosures are never appropriate.
To the contrary, when lower-level employees are guilty of mis-
conduct, internal reporting will most likely be preferred; but if
managerial or high-level-official misconduct is pervasive, it is
far more likely that the whistleblower, out of necessity, will
turn to external reporting channels.86 In light of the need for
both secrecy and accountability, statutory protections for IC
whistleblowing should be tempered by a recognition of the po-
tential for concurrent harm to national security, and drafters
should therefore deliberately attempt to strike the correct, deli-
more heat than light, while revealing methods to our adversaries that could
impact our operations in ways that we may not fully understand for years to
come.”); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972)
(“What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to
one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of
information in its proper context.”). Some courts even give near absolute def-
erence to the Executive branch on issues relating to national security and
intelligence operations under the theory that “only experienced individuals
steeped in national security can know if seemingly harmless tidbits of infor-
mation can be disclosed without causing harm.” David Rudenstine, The
Courts and National Security: The Ordeal of the State Secrets Privilege, 44 U.
BALT. L. REV. 37, 64 (2014) (citing Beth George, Note, An Administrative Law
Approach to Reforming the State Secrets Privilege, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1691,
1700−01 (2009)).
85. See, e.g., Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21 (“If any
individual who objects to government policy can take it in their own hands to
publicly disclose classified information, then we will never be able to keep our
people safe or conduct foreign policy.”). Moreover, such a statute may reduce
the quality of government decision making. See Papandrea, supra note 45, at
482.
86. Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Princi-
ples for Designing Effective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 43
(2012) (citing Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in
Organizations: An Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165, 180
(2008) (“[W]hen the subject matter of the unlawfulness . . . implicated the
entire organization . . . external enforcement was the chosen path.”)). The
need for public, external disclosures in certain circumstances has even been
recognized in the international community. Whistleblower Protection Report,
supra note 1, at 4 para. 6.2.3. (“Where internal channels . . . have not func-
tioned properly, or could reasonably not be expected to function properly giv-
en the nature of the problem raised by the ‘whistle-blower’, external ‘whistle-
blowing’, including through the media, should likewise be protected.”).
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cate balance between the equally important and competing in-
terests of secrecy and democracy.
II. HISTORY OFWHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS IN THEUNITED
STATES
“Given the unique power of the state, it is not enough for
leaders to say: trust us, we won’t abuse the data we collect.
For history has too many examples when that trust has been
breached. Our system of government is built on the premise
that our liberty cannot depend on the good intentions of those
in power; it depends upon the law to constrain those in pow-
er.”87
The concept of whistleblowing88 in the United States has ex-
isted since the Nation’s founding, and the vital function it
serves has long been recognized. 89 Whistleblowing both en-
hances governmental accountability and transparency as well
as prevents wrongdoing.90 However, Congress did not officially
recognize until 1978, when the Civil Service Reform Act was
passed, that a duty to disclose wrongdoing must be accompa-
nied by statutory protections from retaliation in order to be
87. Presidential Remarks on Intelligence, supra note 21.
88. Notably, the term whistleblowing, by contrast, is of comparatively re-
cent vintage, being coined by Ralph Nader in the 1970’s to avoid the negative
connotations of other words used to refer to the same people, such as “snitch”
or “informer.” Whistleblowing: Origin of Term, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistleblower#Origin_of_term (last modified
Jan. 24, 2014, 1:09 AM) (citing NADER, ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING (1972)).
89. Indeed, the first whistleblower protection statute was passed by the
Continental Congress in 1778. S. RES. 202, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted). The
Continental Congress unanimously resolved to enact the first whistleblower
statute, which stated that “it is the duty of all persons in the service of the
United States . . . to give the earliest information to Congress or other proper
authority of any misconduct, frauds or misdemeanors committed by any offic-
ers or persons in the service of these states, which may come to their
knowledge.” Id.
90. 2011 G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN, supra note 81 (“Whistle-
blower protection is essential to encourage the reporting of misconduct, fraud
and corruption . . . . The protection of . . . whistleblowers from retaliation . . .
is . . . integral . . . to combat corruption, promote public sector integrity and
accountability, and support a clean business environment.”). See also Calland
& Dehn, supra note 33 (“Whistleblowing is a key way to deliver accountabil-
ity (by which we mean that people are expected to explain their conduct).”).
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meaningful.91 For this reason, most government workers kept
their heads down and ignored corruption, abuse, and miscon-
duct for the majority of U.S. history, keeping silent for fear of
retaliation.92 Moreover, IC workers were entirely unprotected
for an additional twenty years.93
A. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”)
Important whistleblower protection reforms in the United
States commenced with the passage of the CSRA,94 which was
enacted in the wake of the Watergate Scandal.95 As “the first
major overhaul of the federal civil service” in nearly a centu-
ry,96 the CSRA created the Merit Systems Protection Board
(“MSPB”) and the Office of the Special Counsel (“OSC”).97 Un-
der the CSRA, the Special Counsel’s role was to receive reports
from federal workers of waste, fraud, and abuse and to investi-
gate such reports as warranted.98 Secondly, the MSPB’s role
then was to “process hearings and appeals affecting Federal
employees” 99 and administer corrective action to agencies
whose officials engaged in prohibited practices.100 Accordingly,
the OSC was to receive complaints from federal workers that
their employer had engaged in a “prohibited personnel prac-
91. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. For
more on this Act, see infra Part II.A.
92. Fear of reprisal was one of the most common reasons for refusing to
blow the whistle as late as 2012. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
93. IC workers finally obtained some relief––albeit, extremely limited re-
lief––for their lack of whistleblower protections with the passing of the Intel-
ligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA), Pub. L.
105-272, 112 Stat. 2413. For a detailed discussion of this legislation’s provi-
sions, effectiveness, and shortcomings, see infra Part II.C.
94. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
95. See generally, ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 72–88 (2012) (arguing that Congress probably would
not have enacted the CSRA absent the occurrence of the Watergate scandal).
The author noted that “[w]histleblowers played important roles in the Wa-
tergate scandal and one of them, Daniel Ellsberg, figured prominently in the
motivation for the presidential cover-up of the Watergate break-in.” Id. at 72.
96. Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False
Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 369 (1991).
97. Id.
98. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. 95-454, § 1206(a), 92
Stat. 1111, 1125; see also Fisher, supra note 96, at 371–72.
99. Sec. 3(1), 92 Stat. at 1112.
100. § 1206(h), 92 Stat. at 1129; Fisher, supra note 96, at 372.
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tice,” determine if such reports were well founded, 101 investi-
gate well-founded reports, and “prosecute federal employees
committing prohibited personnel practices against their subor-
dinates for whistleblower and other activities.”102 However, the
CSRA explicitly excluded IC workers from its protections,103
and a worker whose report of a prohibited personnel action was
determined to be unfounded by the Special Counsel had no fur-
ther recourse.104 The MSPB’s “poor” performance in the ensu-
ing years,105 perhaps unsurprisingly, is a patent illustration of
the Act’s near utter failure to protect government whistleblow-
ers. This subsequently created the need for additional legisla-
tion to guarantee that federal employees received the protec-
tions that the CSRA purported to provide.
B. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (“WPA”)
After over a decade of experience under the CSRA, Congress
found that “Federal employees who make disclosures . . . serve
the public interest by assisting in the elimination of fraud,
waste, abuse, and unnecessary Government expenditures”106
and that “protecting employees who disclose Government ille-
gality, waste, and corruption is a major step toward a more ef-
fective civil service.”107 In light of the CSRA’s failure to ade-
quately protect whistleblowers, the WPA was enacted in 1989
101. § 1206(b), 92 Stat. at 1125.
102. Fisher, supra note 96, at 371.
103. “Agenc[ies]” protected by the CSRA “do[] not include . . . the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Secu-
rity Agency, and, as determined by the President, any Executive agency or
unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelli-
gence or counterintelligence activities.” § 2302(a)(2)(C), 92 Stat. at 1115.
104. Fisher, supra note 96, at 370, 399 (“[I]f the Special Counsel investigat-
ed the prohibited personnel practice case and decided not to pursue the mat-
ter before the MSPB, that ended the matter for career employees. The CSRA
did not confer on the victim an express or implied cause of action for reprisal
for whistleblowing.”) (citing Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Walker v. Gibson, 604 F. Supp. 916, 926 (N.D. Ill. 1985)).
105. Id. at 386 (“Given the OSC’s crucial role in whistleblower protection
under the CSRA it would be an understatement to say that the OSC’s per-
formance was poor. It was marked largely by inaction, frequent hostility to
whistleblower claims, and arguable distortion of the OSC’s role vis-à-vis
whistleblowers.”).
106. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA), Pub. L. 101-12, sec.
2(a)(1), 103 Stat. 16, 16.
107. Sec. 2(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 16.
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“to strengthen and improve protection for the rights of Federal
employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdo-
ing within the government.”108 The Act gave effect to this pur-
pose by, inter alia, “mandating that employees should not suf-
fer adverse consequences as a result of prohibited personnel
practices,”109 establishing that the OSC’s “primary role . . . is to
protect employees, especially whistleblowers, from prohibited
personnel practices,”110 and imposing a duty on the OSC to “act
in the interests of employees who seek assistance from the
[OSC].”111 In addition to protecting federal employees from re-
taliation for reporting with a reasonable belief 112 the same
types of government misconduct enumerated in the CSRA,113
the WPA also granted complainants a right to federal appeal of
adjudications by the MSPB that were formerly considered to be
108. Sec. 2(b), 103 Stat. at 16
109. Sec. 2(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 16.
110. Sec. 2(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 16. Notably, the definition of “prohibited
personnel practices” was expanded to include even a threat to take or fail to
take a personnel action as retaliation for a protected disclosure. § 2302(b)(9),
103 Stat. at 32.
111. The OSC was established to investigate and bring enforcement actions
when appropriate upon receiving allegations of retaliation against whistle-
blowers. §1212(a), 103 Stat. at 19.
112. The reasonableness of a whistleblower’s belief is judged by “whether a
disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and
readily ascertainable by the employee reasonably conclude that the actions of
the government’ evidence wrongdoing as defined by the statute.” 2011 G20
ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN, supra note 81, para. 16 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000)). This definition was later codified in
the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), sec. 103, §
2302(b), Pub. L. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, 1466–1467. The Act provides as
follows:
[A] determination as to whether an employee or applicant reasona-
bly believes that such employee or applicant has disclosed infor-
mation that evidences any violation of law, rule, regulation, gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety shall be
made by determining whether a disinterested observer with
knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable
by the employee or applicant could reasonably conclude that the ac-
tions of the Government evidence such violations, mismanagement,
waste abuse, or danger.
Id.
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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strictly final.114 However, while the WPA explicitly set forth the
powers and functions of the OSC115 and enumerated detailed
procedures for the OSC’s handling of reports of misconduct by
whistleblowers,116 it failed to expand such statutory protections
to include IC workers.117
In addition to the shortcomings of the WPA’s coverage, the
WPA “bec[ame] an unexpected minefield for the intrepid Fed-
eral employee who unknowingly risk[ed] his or her career by
taking the law’s promise of protection at face value.”118 Not-
withstanding enactment of the WPA, “it remain[ed] difficult”
for those who suffered retaliation to prove their case.119 Moreo-
ver, failure of the OSC and MSPB to accomplish their objec-
tives meant that most individuals who chose to blow the whis-
tle were ostensibly hung out to dry with no recourse. Substan-
tial personal damages were the norm for even those who effec-
tively invoked the statutory protections, and few whistleblow-
ers’ careers escaped unscathed. 120 As Congress’s second at-
tempt to protect federal whistleblowers, the WPA gave little
hope to would-be whistleblowers because the Act’s provisions
114. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-12, sec. 3, §
1221(h)(1), 103 Stat. 16, 30–31.
115. §§ 1212–19, 103 Stat. at 19–29.
116. §§ 1213–15, 103 Stat. at 21–28.
117. Under the WPA, like the CSRA, disclosures are only protected insofar
as they are “not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not
specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs. . . .” § 1213, 103 Stat. at 21.
The effect of this was to almost entirely preclude protection for disclosures by
IC workers given that much of the information they have access to that may
evidence wrongful, reportable conduct is classified. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the WPA specifically failed to amend 5
U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii), as established by the CSRA, see supra note 103,
which expressly excluded employees of most IC agencies from all whistle-
blower protections.
118. Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whis-
tleblowers, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 187 (2012) (describing the WPA as
a “false promise of protection” for whistleblowers).
119. Id. at 187 n.13 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-3,
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: DETERMINING WHETHER REPRISAL OCCURRED
REMAINS DIFFICULT 1 (1992), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/217067.pdf).
120. McCarthy, supra note 118, at 187. For a detailed description of com-
mon ways that employers and agency heads have historically punished whis-
tleblowers that are remarkably effective yet avoid the statutory prohibitions,
see Fisher, supra note 96, at 363−69.
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were confusing and the government actors tasked with protect-
ing whistleblowers failed to deliver.
C. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998
(“ICWPA”)
Congress passed the ICWPA121 in part based on its findings
that the reporting of Executive misconduct by IC workers may
have been chilled by fear of retaliation.122 Therefore, Congress
felt that a procedure should be implemented to encourage the
flow of information between the Executive and the Legislative
branches of government.123 Importantly, Congress recognized
the significance of its constitutionally granted authority to
check the Executive’s power, and, moreover, recognized that
being informed of alleged wrongdoing within the IC is critical
to that power-check’s effectiveness and continued vitality.124
Under the ICWPA, both employees and contractors of various
IC agencies125—including the NSA—who intend to blow the
whistle with respect to an “urgent concern”126 may disclose the
121. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998
(ICWPA), Pub. L. No. 105-272, tit. VII, 112 Stat. 2396 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 & 50 U.S.C.).
122. Sec. 701(b)(5), 112 Stat. at 2414.
123. Sec. 701(b)(6), 112 Stat. at 2414.
124. Sec. 701(b)(3), 112 Stat. at 2413. This acknowledgement, however, was
tempered by the recognition that while “national security is a shared respon-
sibility, [it requires] mutual respect by Congress and the President,” and “the
principles of comity between the branches of Government apply to the han-
dling of national security information.” Sec. 701(b)(1)–(2), 112 Stat. at 2413.
The statute is therefore deceptive because it purports to implement a power-
checking mechanism while simultaneously reciting policy-based rationaliza-
tions that are substantial impediments to fulfilling this power-checking func-
tion, such as the maintenance of secrecy.
125. The CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security
Agency, the FBI, and any agency that the President determines has “the con-
duct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities” as “its principal
function.” Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2414; sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2415.
126. Urgent concern is defined as any of the following: “[a] serious or fla-
grant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relat-
ing to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence activity
involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions
concerning public policy matters;” “[a] false statement to Congress, or a will-
ful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the
funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence opportunity;” or “[a]n
action including a personnel action described in [the WPA] constituting re-
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pertinent information to the Inspector General (“IG”) of the de-
partment to which the employee’s agency belongs.127 Upon re-
ceiving a report of wrongdoing, the IG must assess the credibil-
ity of the report or complaint.128 Depending on which agency
the employee works for, the IG must forward the report to ei-
ther the Director or the head of the establishment if the report
is deemed credible.129 In turn, the Director or establishment
head must append any comments deemed necessary and for-
ward the report and comments to either of the Congressional
Intelligence Committees.130 Alternatively, if the IG determines
that the allegations lack credibility, no further action is re-
quired, rendering the whistleblower’s attempt to rectify agency
wrongdoing “dead in the water.”131 To make matters worse for
an IC whistleblower, decisions about how reports of misconduct
prisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under [the WPA].” Sec. 702(a)(1), 112
Stat. at 2415; sec. 702 (b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416.
127. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2414; sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2415. No-
tably, while the ICWPA states that both employees and contractors may re-
port urgent concerns to the IG of the relevant agency, the remaining provi-
sions of the act only apply to employees. Accordingly, the provision requiring
the agency to notify an employee who reports misconduct of any actions taken
or decisions made with respect to such report, sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at
2415; 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416, does not apply to a contractor who disclos-
es the same information to the same party. Furthermore, unlike employees,
the Act does not grant contractors the right to report directly to the intelli-
gence committees of Congress if the IG, director, or establishment head fails
to handle a report of misconduct appropriately. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at
2414; sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416. Thus, the ICWPA’s appearance of es-
pousing a “no loophole” approach to whistleblower protection by its inclusion
of contractors in certain provisions, this appearance is merely illusory, and
contractors are not protected from reprisals.
128. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2414; 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416.
129. The Director, if the agency is the CIA, or the “head of the establish-
ment,” in the case of an alternative agency falling under the coverage of the
ICWPA. Id.
130. The ICWPA defines intelligence committees as “the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.” Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2415;
sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2417.
131. The phrase dead in the water describes “an idea or scheme [that] has
no momentum and no chance of success.” It is a nautical analogy that “dat[es]
back to the days of sailing ships,” which derives its meaning from the fact
that “[o]n a windless day, with nothing to propel the vessel, a boat sitting
motionless in the sea was known as ‘dead in the water’, going nowhere.”
ALBERT JACK, RED HERRINGS & WHITE ELEPHANTS—THE ORIGINS OF THE
PHRASESWEUSEEVERYDAY 4 (2004) (emphasis added).
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are handled rendered by the Director, establishment head, or
IG are not subject to judicial review.132 Finally, if the IG does
not transmit the complaint or information to the appropriate
party, an employee may report directly to Congress.133 Howev-
er, the employee may report directly to Congress only after the
employee follows the procedures set forth above and subse-
quently attains and complies with the Director’s or department
head’s directions for contacting Congress in compliance with
the applicable security procedures.134
In light of these procedures, the Acting IG for the Depart-
ment of Defense described the ICWPA’s statutory name as a
“misnomer” and stated that it is more aptly characterized as “a
statute protecting communications of classified information to .
. . Congress.”135 While Congressional oversight can be an effec-
tive check on Executive agencies’ powers,136 any power-check
purportedly created by the ICWPA, and any alleged resulting
protection for IC whistleblowers, is merely illusory because the
IG has the discretion to determine that any report or complaint
made by an IC whistleblower is not credible.137 Because credi-
bility determinations are final (i.e., not subject to judicial re-
view),138 a complaint alleging wrongdoing that is deemed to
132. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2415; sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416.
133. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2414; sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416.
134. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2414; sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416.
135. National Security Whistleblowers in the Post-September 11th Era––
Lost in a Labyrinth and Facing Subtle Retaliation: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Nat’l Sec. Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations of the H.R. Comm.
on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 391–92 (2006) (Statement of Thomas F. Gimble,
Acting Inspector General, Dep’t of Defense). See also McCarthy, supra note
118, at 196 n.79 (“The misnamed Intelligence Community Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act . . . does not actually protect whistleblowers against reprisal.”).
136. See generally, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Con-
gressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch
Themselves)?, 54-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1991) (recognizing that
congressional oversight is a powerful in the context of the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”)). But cf. Steven Shimberg, Checks and Balance:
Limitations on the Power of Congressional Oversight, 54-AUT LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (1991) (recognizing the disadvantages and limitations of
congressional oversight in the context of the EPA).
137. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2414; sec. 702(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416.
138. Sec. 702(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2415; sec. 702 (b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2416.
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lack credibility may never be addressed,139 and the reported
conduct may continue unabated. 140 In essence, requiring IC
employees to contact and follow the orders of high-ranking offi-
cials in the agency whose conduct is complained of “amount[s]
to asking a fox to watch the henhouse.”141
Finally, and most importantly, while the Act establishes a
procedure to facilitate a flow of allegations of IC wrongdoing
between the two branches of government and is designed to en-
courage reporting,142 it grants IC whistleblowers no affirmative
protections from retaliation.143 Where previous whistleblower
legislation expressly prohibited a plethora of personnel practic-
es in retaliation for making a lawful disclosure,144 the ICWPA
remains silent. As a result, the Act is little more than an empty
promise. Duped by the Act’s misleading title, more than one
naïve IC worker’s false hopes of protection were promptly ex-
tinguished when they reported perceived misconduct and
strictly complied with the prescribed procedures.145 According-
ly, IC workers are well-advised to deliberate at length and pro-
ceed with caution before reporting IC wrongdoing, at least un-
der the current statutory framework.
D. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012
(“WPEA”)
Before Congress passed the WPEA,146 federal employee sur-
veys conducted by the MSPB demonstrated that the most oft-
cited reasons for not blowing the whistle, even when wrongdo-
ing was perceived, is that federal employees felt their reports
would not be addressed and feared retaliation.147 Accordingly,
139. The Act lacks any mandates once a determination––which is not sub-
ject to judicial review––is made that a complaint lacks credibility and there
are no provisions for protection from retaliation.
140. Mendelsohn, supra note 40.
141. Knight, supra note 39, at 292 (citations omitted).
142. Supra notes 122 and 123 and accompanying text.
143. McCarthy, supra note 118, at 196 n.79.
144. See supra Part II.B.
145. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 39.
146. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), Pub. L.
No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
147. Whistleblower Protection Report, supra note 1, at 7 para. 8 (citing Tom
Devine, Whistleblowing in the United States: the Gap Between Vision and
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Congress passed the WPEA in response to diminishing protec-
tions that federal whistleblowers experienced in recent years
stemming, in large part, from the judiciary’s narrow construc-
tion of exactly what kind of disclosures are statutorily protect-
ed.148 To enhance federal whistleblower protections, the WPEA
sought to clarify which disclosures qualified federal employees
for protection from reprisal,149 mandated that non-disclosure-
type agreements or policies explicitly state that federal em-
ployees’ right to blow are not affected, and granted “certain au-
thority” to the Special Counsel.150 The Act also imposed a duty
on agency heads to inform employees of their right to report
“classified information relating to national security” to certain
designated parties. 151
While the WPEA implemented myriad new policies designed
to enhance the protections of federal whistleblowers, like each
of the Act’s predecessors, it included an express exception that
prevented IC workers from receiving the benefits of protection
provided thereby.152 Initially, the bill included specific protec-
tions for IC workers. However, they were stripped from the Act
in response to House Republican’s objections, much to Presi-
dent Obama’s chagrin.153
E. Presidential Policy Directive 19
Because President Barack Obama perceived the exclusion of
IC workers from whistleblower protections as a shortcoming
that warranted addressing, he signed Presidential Policy Di-
Lessons Learned, in WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THEWORLD 81 (Richard Callan
& Guy Dehn, eds., 2005)).
148. S. REP. NO. 112–155, at 1–2 (2012).
149. Sec. 101, 126 Stat. at 1465−66.
150. Pmbl., 126 Stat. at 1465. For example, the WPEA authorized the Spe-
cial Counsel to appear as amicus curiae in any case relating to whistleblow-
ing to express an opinion about what effect a decision in that case would have
on the enforcement of certain provisions of the statute. Sec. 112, § 2302(c),
126 Stat. 1472.
151. Sec. 113, § 1212(h)(1), 126 Stat. at 1472.
152. The WPEA does not protect employees of the FBI, the CIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NDA,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Reconnais-
sance Office, or any Executive agency or unit that the President determines
has the principal function of intelligence activities. Sec. 105, §
2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I)–(II), 126 Stat. at 1468.
153. Arnold, supra note 43.
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rective 19 (“PPD-19”) in 2012,154 which “embraces those agen-
cies not covered by the WPEA.”155 While PPD-19 extends the
coverage of whistleblower protections to IC employees who
were previously excluded altogether, many commentators have
criticized PPD-19 as failing to create any real reform or grant
effective protections that were previously lacking. 156 Signifi-
cantly, whether contractors are protected by PPD-19 is doubt-
ful in view of the Obama Administration’s response that “the
Executive Branch is evaluating the scope [of PPD-19]” when
asked specifically about its coverage of contractors.157
154. PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 19, BARACK OBAMA (2012),
http://www.va.gov/ABOUT_VA/docs/President-Policy-Directive-PPD-19.pdf
[hereinafter PPD-19].
155. R. Scott Oswald, A Closer Look at Presidential Policy Directive 19, LAW
360 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www. law360.com/articles/460838/a-closer-look-at-
presidential-policy-directive-19. For a list of agencies not covered by the
WPEA, see supra note 152.
156. One commentator has argued that while PPD-19
provides national security employees with some additional whistle-
blowing protections they have not enjoyed until now, . . . these pro-
tections still fall short of what other government employees have,
and they do not cover government contractors. In addition, national
security whistleblowers have little shelter from retaliation, and the
judicial branch has no authority to review any retaliation claims
they might have. As a result, the executive branch has virtually un-
checked authority to declare what information is secret and to pun-
ish leakers as it sees fit.
Papandrea, supra note 45, at 490. Another author noted that PPD-19 is “not
as robust as needed.” Arnold, supra note 43. Finally, a notable institution
criticized PPD-19 by stating that “[t]he directive could facilitate transparency
in instances where one employee is aware of another employee’s rogue mis-
conduct, but is unlikely to have much effect in cases where the agency itself is
complicit in the wrongdoing and the intelligence committees are not willing
to interfere.” BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCH. L., NATIONAL SECURITY
WHISTLEBLOWING: A GAP IN THE LAW 2 (2013),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Factsheet%20-
%20National%20Security%20Whistleblowing.pdf.
157. Arnold, supra note 43.
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III. APPLICATION OF U.K. LAW TO THEU.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMMUNITY
“[L]ike anybody preparing for a potentially precarious journey
a good map and a compass are useful commodities if you are
going to arrive safely at your destination.”158
In the United Kingdom, the Public Interest Disclosure Act
(“PIDA”) was enacted by Parliament in response to “a series of
avoidable disasters”159 “to protect individuals who make certain
disclosures of information in the public interest [and] to allow
such individuals to bring action in respect of victimisation.”160
For non-IC workers in the United Kingdom, however, the crite-
ria that must be satisfied for a disclosure to qualify for protec-
tion are significantly more stringent than under the WPEA.
For example, the PIDA first requires a whistleblower to have a
“reasonable belief” that the disclosure “tends to show” at least
one of the following has occurred in the past, is currently occur-
ring, or is likely to occur: a criminal offense, failure of a person
to comply with a legal duty, a miscarriage of justice, endan-
germent to an individual’s health or safety, damage to the en-
vironment, or deliberate concealment of information evidencing
any of the previous items in this list.161
Furthermore, the PIDA enumerates specific channels
through which a whistleblower may disclose information in or-
der to qualify for protections from employer retaliation, which
include the worker’s “employer or other responsible person,” a
“legal adviser,” a “Minister of the Crown,” or another party that
the Secretary of State, by order, prescribes (a “Prescribed Re-
158. Richard Calland & Guy Dehn,Whistleblowing Around the World: Giv-
ing People a Voice, in WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THEWORLD 199, 203 (Richard
Calland & Guy Dehn, eds. 2004). The authors continue, “Thus, in addition to
the protection the law provides and its signposting for a new culture, the
guidance that legislation provides is crucial for whistleblowing. At the very
least, as we know from the organisations we run, the guidance the law offers
encourages potential whistleblowers to identify their destination or what it is
they are trying to achieve.” Id.
159. Whistleblower Protection Report, supra note 1, at 7 para. 7. Such trag-
edies include “the sinking of the ferry Herald of Free Enterprise and the de-
struction of an oil platform in the North Sea.” Id.
160. Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998, c. 23, pmbl. (UK) [hereinafter
PIDA].
161. Id. sec. 43B.
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cipient”).162 The PIDA even permits disclosures of such infor-
mation through nonenumerated channels, but in so permitting,
the statute mandates that five conditions must be satisfied: the
disclosure was made in good faith; the whistleblower “reasona-
bly believe[d]” the information and any allegations therein are
“substantially true”; the whistleblower did not disclose infor-
mation “for purposes of personal gain”; any of the conditions in
subsection (2) is met; and in view of the totality of the circum-
stances, the disclosure was reasonable. 163 The conditions in
subsection 2, of which one must be satisfied for a disclosure
made through a non-enumerated channel to qualify for disclo-
sure are as follows: the whistleblower reasonably believed he
would be “subjected to a detriment by his employer” if the dis-
closure were made to the employer or a party prescribed by the
Secretary of State; the whistleblower reasonably believed evi-
dence relating to the subject of the report would be destroyed if
made to his employer and no Prescribed Recipient exists to re-
ceive such disclosure; or “substantially the same information”
was already disclosed to the worker’s employer or a Prescribed
Recipient.164
One important distinction is that the PIDA “did not set out to
encourage whistleblowing—it merely aims to protect those who
raise a particular type of concern . . . in a specified way.”165 Ad-
ditionally, the PIDA applies to nearly all employees,166 whereas
the WPEA protects only government workers. Accordingly, the
PIDA has been “described as one of the most far-reaching whis-
162. Id. secs. 43C–F.
163. Id. sec. 43G(1). Relevant factors to the determination of whether it was
reasonable for a worker to make the disclosure in view of the totality of the
circumstances include, but are not limited to, the recipient’s identity, the “se-
riousness” of the conduct that is the subject of a disclosure, whether the con-
duct is likely to continue or recur, and whether a “duty of confidentiality” was
breached by making the disclosure. Id. sec. 43G(3).
164. Id. sec. 43G(2).
165. David Lewis, Ten Years of Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 Claims:
What Can We Learn from the Statistics and Recent Research?, 39 INDUS. L. J.
325, 328 (2010).
166. Evelyn Oakley & Anna Myers, The UK: Public Concern at Work, in
WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THE WORLD 169, 173 n.12 (Richard Calland & Guy
Dehn eds., 2004).
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tleblower protection laws in the world.”167 Moreover, the PIDA
“fiercely protects internal reports.”168
The PIDA, however, is not without its own shortcomings.
First, despite the PIDA’s coverage of more workers than U.S.
whistleblower protection laws and strong protection of internal
reports,169 it is far more difficult for a whistleblower to qualify
for protection under the PIDA when making an external disclo-
sure.170 Second, despite the existence of statutory protections,
the PIDA’s strong favoritism of internal reporting has been
heavily criticized because employers often ignore internal re-
ports.171 Indeed, in cases where workers have gone so far as to
actually report wrongdoing, it is no surprise that many decline
to further report suspected wrongdoing once the initial report
is ignored by their employers. Third, the PIDA’s model of whis-
tleblower protection is imperfect in its application to nearly all
U.K. workers. Whistleblower protection statutes should not be
a “one size fits all” solution to all corruption and abusive con-
duct.172 Therefore, because a single statute governs all whistle-
blowing activity in the United Kingdom,173 Parliament failed to
distinguish certain unique classes of whistleblowers from oth-
ers and recognize that they warrant special treatment. Finally,
the PIDA has been heavily criticized as being difficult for aver-
167. Id. at 173.
168. Mendelsohn, supra note 40, at 723. By contrast, “despite the incom-
prehensibility of much of American whistleblower law, it still clearly favors
external reporting.” Id.
169. Oakley & Myers, supra note 166, at 173.
170. Compare PIDA, supra note 160, secs. 43G & 43H with 5 U.S.C. § 1211
(requiring only that [1] the whistleblower have a reasonable belief that in-
formation disclosed evidences one of enumerated violations or courses of con-
duct, and [2] that the disclosure was not prohibited by law or the information
required to be kept secret by executive order).
171. One study demonstrated that managers ignored three out of four re-
ports of whistleblowers who disclosed wrongdoing internally within their or-
ganizations. Rajeev Syal, Whistleblowers Claims of Wrongdoing Being Ig-
nored, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2013, 1:00 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/may/14/whistleblowers-claims-
ignored. However, this may not be a problem with the statute’s drafting as
much as it is with implementation, as with the MSPB’s poor performance
following enactment of the CSRA in the United States.
172. Contra Mendelsohn, supra note 40, at 743 (“A model law should have a
single source of protection so that an employee can know where to look to see
if his speech is protected.”).
173. Id.
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age civilian workers to navigate in light of the complexity of the
procedural requirements that must be satisfied for a disclosure
to qualify for protection.174
Despite these criticisms, the PIDA is a good model to model
for IC whistleblower protection statute because of its prefer-
ence for internal reporting. The fact that the U.K. model has
been commended as “skillfully achieving the essential but deli-
cate balance between the public interest and the interests of
employers”175 illustrates how befitting this model is: this deli-
cate balance is quite analogous to the balance of secrecy and
democracy that an IC whistleblower protection statute must
strike.176 Finally, the criticisms of the PIDA for its stringent
criteria for an external disclosure to qualify for protection and
complex procedural requirements will not carry the same
weight if this model is applied to IC workers. In fact, in the in-
telligence community—wherein the ability to maintain a cer-
tain level of secrecy is indispensable 177—application of the
PIDA’s strong preference for internal reporting, near universal
protection of good faith disclosures made to designated internal
recipients,178 and complex procedural requirements are highly
desirable because such attributes will encourage would-be
whistleblowers to deliberate at length before disclosing sensi-
tive information externally or departing from clearly defined
procedures. Encouraging such processes is important for an IC
whistleblower protection statute because they serve to protect
the secrecy of properly classified information that has the po-
tential to harm national security.
Because the factors that enter consideration when fashioning
a remedy for the current lack of IC whistleblower protections
are unique to the IC,179 merely expanding the class of individu-
als protected by current U.S. whistleblower protection statutes
to include IC workers, as some commentators have advocat-
174. Id. at 737 n.82 (citing LUCY VICKERS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EMPLOYMENT 116 (2002)).
175. Oakley & Myers, supra note 166, at 173 (citing Lord Nolan, former
Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life).
176. See supra Part I.
177. See, e.g., Chinen, supra note 29, at 14−15.
178. See generallyMendelsohn, supra note 40.
179. Id. See generally Chinen, supra note 29.
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ed,180 will not solve a problem as multifaceted as IC whistle-
blowing. Most importantly, a simple expansion of the statutes’
protected class would fail to strike an optimal balance between
the competing interests of secrecy and democratic accountabil-
ity.181 Instead, the United States should supplement the cur-
rent statutory framework by passing legislation that amends
current whistleblower protection statutes182 to emulate many of
the PIDA’s provisions, underlying purposes, and guiding prin-
ciples. Such legislation should enumerate clear procedures that
would make understanding how to make a legal disclosure that
qualifies for protection easy.
IV. PROPOSAL
The following proposal first enumerates the principle that
should guide Congress in drafting legislation that would amend
current whistleblower protection statutes. Second, the proposal
states that current protections should be expanded to protect
IC contractors and enumerates the reasons for their inclusion.
Third, it recommends adding a catch-all provision to the cur-
rent statutory framework where prohibited personnel practices
are enumerated. Finally, it advocates adopting a disclosure re-
gime based on the U.K.’s model and provides the standards for
protection of disclosures made through the prescribed chan-
nels. Finally, the parties the proposed legislation would protect
are briefly described, along with an additional requirement for
the information disclosed to qualify for protection.
A. Comprehensive Statutory Reforms
In devising the proposed legislation, Congress should focus on
both providing “a clear definition of the scope of protected dis-
closures and of the persons afforded protection”183 and estab-
lishing clear “procedures and prescribed channels for facilitat-
ing” whistleblowing.184 Following this principle would prevent
180. U.S.: Statement on Protection of Whistleblowers in Security Sector,
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (June 18, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/us-statement-protection-whistleblowers-
security-sector.
181. See supra Part I.
182. See supra Part II.
183. 2011 G20 ANTI-CORRUPTIONACTION PLAN, supra note 81, at 30.
184. Id. at 32. See also, Miriam A. Cherry, Virtual Whistleblowing, 54 S.
TEX. L. REV. 9, 34 (Fall 2012) (“Whistleblowing employees—and society—will
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the resulting legislation from becoming an “unexpected mine-
field” like the WPA,185 from deceiving IC members into believ-
ing their disclosures are protected like the ICWPA, 186 and
denying individuals protection for small, inadvertent deviation
from complex statutorily prescribed procedures like the PIDA.
With this principle in mind, first, the United States should
adopt a “no loophole” approach, in which contractors are not
excluded from protection.187 Any distinction between an em-
ployee and a contractor is arbitrary: whistleblowing by both
serves the same important function, and the mere fact that
protected individuals include contractors does not increase the
risk of excessive, harmful disclosures. Moreover, distinguishing
between the two classifications and excluding the latter from
the statutory protection only serves to increase the likelihood
that a contract worker who blows the whistle will go directly to
the media rather than attempt to make the disclosure through
appropriate internal channels first.188 Additionally, it is argua-
ble that an individual who is currently a contractor is more de-
serving of protections than a future potential employee or past
applicant, both of which are protected by current U.S. whistle-
blower protection statutes. 189 For these reasons, protection
should not depend on classification of a person as an employee
or a contractor.
be better served by a set of uniform laws that are easily understood by em-
ployees. In this way, we will be able to reach a more optimal level of whistle-
blowing and deterrence for wrongdoing that is discovered within organiza-
tions.”). Of note, this guiding principle may not be as substantial a limit on
Congress as it would were the proposed legislation to apply to all federal em-
ployees. Arguably, understanding the legislation’s coverage and procedures
may be less difficult for members of the IC than a lay-person who works for
the federal government in light of the stringent qualifications required of IC
workers. This does not undercut the importance of clarity to the proposed
legislation, but it does, however, recognize that Congress need not go to great
lengths to simplify the legislation and sacrifice specificity in the process.
185. SeeMcCarthy, supra note 118.
186. See supra Part II.C.
187. 2011 G20 ANTI-CORRUPTIONACTION PLAN, supra note 81, para. 19. Oth-
er world-leading whistleblower protection statutes use this approach. See
PIDA, supra note 160, sec. 43K(1); Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 16 (Austl.)
(protecting all individuals who “perform[] functions in or for an Agency”).
188. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 39, at 281–283.
189. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a) (2002) (including disclosures of specified types of
information by “an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment”
in the coverage of whistleblower protections).
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Second, the United States should add a catch-all provision to
the enumerated list of prohibited personnel practices that pro-
hibits any action for which the IC agency’s primary motivation
is retaliation for a legal disclosure. By adding this provision,
Congress would make illegal all of the practices that employers
have historically used to retaliate against legal whistleblowers
while still skirting the prohibitions of whistleblower protection
statutes.190Moreover, this is consistent with the burden shift-
ing mechanism currently utilized by courts that interpret the
WPEA wherein the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
they would have taken the prohibited personnel action even if
the IC worker had not blown the whistle.191
Finally, the United States should adopt a tiered disclosure
regime similar to that employed by the U.K.’s PIDA. The legis-
lation should first require that any IC whistleblower report al-
legations of wrongdoing to either his employer, the agency IG,
or the head of the department to which the agency belongs. As
under the PIDA, any report to these individuals made with a
“good faith” belief192 that “a violation of any law, rule or regula-
190. For example, after an employee discloses suspected wrongdoing, his or
her employer may point out deficiencies in the employee’s present or past
performance that would have previously been overlooked or ignored; subject
the employee to public humiliation by exposing the employee’s performance
deficiencies in front of co-workers; condemn a type of conduct that the em-
ployer knows the employee has already engaged in and “ask staff members to
report any violations of the condemned conduct”; socially isolate the employee
by excluding him or her from office social activities or by moving the employ-
ee’s office to “a remote, undesirable location”; intentionally “adding to the
duties of the whistleblower to the point that he becomes mentally or physical-
ly unable to perform his work,” resulting in poor performance that may ulti-
mately result in termination; continually giving the employee new tasks for
which little or no training is provided, which results in poor performance that
warrants punishment; etc. For a detailed description of how these various
tactics work to punish whistleblowers, see Fisher, supra note 96, at 363–69.
191. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2) (2012) (“Corrective action . . . may not be ordered
if the agency demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure.”);
Watson v. Dep’t of Justice, 64 F.3d 1524, 1528 (1995) (“The statute requires
only that the agency demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it
would take the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclo-
sure; it does not require . . . that the adverse personnel action be based on
facts ‘completely separate and distinct from protected whistleblowing disclo-
sures.’”).
192. This language is borrowed from the PIDA, supra note 160, sec.
43F(1)(a).
1028 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
tion . . . or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to pub-
lic health or safety”193 (each a “Reportable Violation”) is occur-
ring or will recur would be almost universally protected. If re-
porting through one of these internal channels proved futile,194
an IC worker should be permitted to disclose the information to
a designated second-tier recipient—either of the congressional
intelligence committees.195 For a disclosure through this chan-
nel to qualify for protection, the IC worker must hold a reason-
able belief “that the information disclosed, and any allegation
contained in it, are substantially true.” 196 As a last resort,
should the report to Congress also prove futile, the proposed
legislation would permit disclosure of Reportable Violations to
the media, a public outlet, or any other recipient that could be
reasonably trusted to responsibly handle the information.
To minimize the third type of disclosures, however, protection
from retaliation would be predicated upon satisfaction of excep-
tionally strict criteria. Such protection for external whistle-
blowers would be warranted only if, at the time of disclosure,
[1] the IC worker disclosed substantially the same information
to a designated first- and second-tier recipient (the “Exhaus-
tion Provision”);197 [2] the report was not made for personal
gain;198 [3] the IC worker “reasonably believes that the infor-
mation disclosed, and any allegation contained therein, is sub-
stantially true”;199 [4] the Reportable Violation is ongoing un-
193. This language is borrowed from 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(2)(A) and (B).
194. Ideally, futility of disclosure could be proven by showing that the recip-
ient of the complaint failed to act thereupon within a specified time limit.
Disclosure to the first two tiers should also be considered futile if the recipi-
ent disagrees with the IC worker about whether the disclosed information
constitutes a Reportable Violation requiring corrective action. The futility
element would, in effect, create a chain of appeals.
195. This provision is borrowed in part from the ICWPA. See supra notes
133 and 134 and accompanying text.
196. This language is borrowed from the PIDA, supra note 160, sec.
43F(1)(b)(ii). The proposed Act, however, would eliminate the PIDA’s re-
quirement that the whistleblower reasonably believe “that the relevant fail-
ure falls within any description of matters in respect of which that person is
so prescribed.” PIDA, supra note 160, sec. 43F(1)(b)(i). Such a condition re-
quires too much of a would-be whistleblower and might hinder disclosures of
wrongdoing.
197. This principle is based upon the PIDA, supra note 160, sec. 43G(2)(c).
198. Id. sec. 43G(1)(c).
199. Id. sec. 43G(1)(b).
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less the whistleblower did not know or have reason to know the
conduct constituting a Reportable Violation has desisted; and
[5] no properly classified information or documents was dis-
closed to a party not authorized to view them.200 Such stringent
preconditions for public disclosures to qualify for protections
would attenuate the risk of a well-intentioned IC worker inad-
vertently disclosing seemingly innocuous national security in-
formation that, in reality, has the potential to cause irrepara-
ble harm.201
This tiered disclosure regime, as well as its Exhaustion Pro-
vision, will serve a vital function in the intelligence community,
where secrecy is of utmost importance.202 Mandating internal
disclosure first, before going public, will ensure that the agency
best positioned to rectify any wrongdoing is the first to know
that a potential problem exists. Furthermore, it gives that
agency an adequate opportunity to correct the reported prob-
lem without compromising confidentiality. Finally, should any
agency receive notice of a Reportable Violation, knowledge that
such information may become public knowledge if the agency
fails to correct the problem within a specified period of time
will promptly spurn an investigation and force the agency to
evaluate whether corrective action is required.
Similarly, requiring that a Reportable Violation be ongoing at
the time of disclosure to qualify for protection furthers the pur-
pose of keeping sensitive information confidential. This re-
quirement discourages reporting in cases where the agency in
question has acted appropriately upon receiving notice of a Re-
portable Violation by discontinuing or properly addressing the
conduct in question. At the same time, it disincentivizes per-
mitting the acts complained of to continue unabated until right
before the IC worker makes an external disclosure. The re-
quirement’s incorporation of a discovery rule would render ex-
ternal disclosures made in such cases protected, provided that
200. The fifth requirement does not prohibit disclosure of all classified in-
formation. Instead, it prohibits only disclosure of information or documents
that were properly classified. In other words, the proposed Act would permit
an IC worker to disclose legally “classified” information that does not contain
sensitive national security information but instead was given its legal status
to keep embarrassing information about illegal government actions or opera-
tions out of the public domain.
201. Rudenstine, supra note 84, at 64.
202. Chinen, supra note 29, at 14–15.
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all other elements of the standard are satisfied. Some commen-
tators will argue that the public has a right to know of past
misconduct committed by the IC. The proposed legislation,
however, is not the appropriate channel through which to ad-
dress this concern.203 The goal of the proposed Act is not to ex-
pose every case of wrongdoing in the IC, but rather to protect
those who do so in the interest of maintaining government ac-
countability in appropriate circumstances. Given the vitality of
secrecy to the IC, by incorporating the Exhaustion Provision
and protecting only disclosures related ongoing wrongdoing,
this model is a superior alternative to the current framework.
For example, an IC whistleblower’s only viable choice under
the current framework is often a public disclosure that could
cause media fallout that forces hastily-devised solutions to ap-
pease the knowing public.
Further, what may be viewed as another limitation of this
proposed model is actually one of its most significant boons:
any individual who discloses classified information through a
third tier channel—whether the disclosure was first made to a
designee from each of the first two tiers or under the excep-
tion—will almost certainly be prosecuted under the 1917 Espi-
onage Act.204 Therefore, the likelihood of a whistleblower being
dragged into court, as well as the stringent criteria that must
be satisfied for this type of whistleblower to qualify for protec-
tions, provide a strong disincentive for any IC worker attempt-
ing to blow the whistle in this manner. IC workers who choose
this path do so at their own risk; and the gravity of this risk
will effectively deter such disclosures in all but the most clear-
cut cases where an IC whistleblower is nearly certain that their
actions will be vindicated during their day in court. This risk
will also encourage would-be IC whistleblowers to engage in
prolonged deliberation before making a disclosure to parties
outside the agency he or she aims to improve.
While the goal of the proposed legislation is to minimize time
consuming and costly litigation, any litigation that thereby re-
203. A viable alternative may be to pursue such inquiries under the Free-
dom of information Act, which authorizes judicial review of Executive deci-
sions to classify documents. It should be noted that in this context the judici-
ary does, perhaps, defer to the Executive more than is necessary, but this
issue, while indeed related, is beyond the scope of this Note and should ac-
cordingly be addressed separately.
204. See generally Takefman, supra note 66.
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sults would be valuable in itself. For example, it would allow
the judiciary to check the Executive’s national security power.
Because this amounts to judicial review of decisions made by
designated recipients of Reportable Violations, any risk of
widespread corruption or inter-branch governmental collusion
would be minimized, the national security power would be ef-
fectively checked, and government accountability would be
achieved. In cases where an IC whistleblower has proceeded
according to procedures mandated by the above proposed legis-
lation, the decision to make a public, external disclosure should
not, and most likely will not, be made lightly; a decision by two
branches of the federal government that the alleged miscon-
duct is, in fact, permissible should be interpreted by most IC
workers as probative evidence that the judiciary may well de-
cide similarly. By permitting all three branches of government
to have input in decisions about the treatment of a Reportable
violation, this model maximizes both governmental transpar-
ency and accountability while still upholding principles of gov-
ernmental inter-branch comity.
CONCLUSION
Without statutory reform, IC workers will continue to dis-
close classified information directly to the media and threaten
national security. While complete elimination of this practice
will likely never be achieved, statutory reform may be the an-
swer that government officials are looking for to curtail this
ever-increasing trend, enabled by the recent technological revo-
lution. Accordingly, new legislation should be enacted to amend
relevant sections of 5 U.S.C. where the majority of whistle-
blower protection statutes are codified.
If the solution proposed above were adopted, the constant
threat of exposure would provide a strong, if not forceful, disin-
centive to illegal action and misconduct by the Executive. In-
deed, in the climate created by this statutory framework, it
would be wise, if not necessary, for any national security deci-
sion to be made only after careful consideration and a diligent
effort to ensure that the resulting decision is authorized by the
Constitution. As a result, if the proposed Act curtails abusive
government practices as predicted, the natural result will be a
corresponding reduction in whistleblowing and risk of inad-
vertent harm to national security from well-intentioned disclo-
sures. Individuals like Edward Snowden should no longer have
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to be “martyrs to their cause”205 and outcasts from the very or-
ganizations they set out to improve by blowing the whistle.206
Burton W. King*
205. Richard Calland & Guy Dehn, Conclusion to, WHISTLEBLOWING
AROUND THEWORLD 199 (Richard Calland & Guy Dehn eds., 2004).
In the old days, miners would take a canary underground with them.
Gas is highly dangerous underground, but very hard to detect. Ca-
naries apparently have more sensitive capacities and could operate
as an early warning system. Whistleblowers have long served a simi-
lar sort of role. Unfortunately, like the canary who [sic] died in the
process, whistleblowers used to be martyrs to their cause. The posi-
tion has now thankfully changed. Seeing whistleblowers as exercis-
ing a ‘right to warn’, they are valued as people who can help organi-
sations and societies to avoid disaster.
206. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA
Revelations, Says His Mission’s Accomplished, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-
after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-
accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html.
During the author’s interview with him, Snowden stated, “I am not trying to
bring down the NSA, I am working to improve the NSA . . . I am still working
for the NSA right now. They are the only ones who don’t realize it.” When
asked what entitled him “to take on that responsibility,” Snowden responded,
“That whole question — who elected you? — inverts the model,” he said.
“They elected me. The overseers.” After noting that those individuals respon-
sible for the NSA’s systematic abuses “elected” him, Snowden qualified this
by explaining “It wasn’t that they put it on me as an individual — that I’m
uniquely qualified, an angel descending from the heavens — as that they put
it on someone, somewhere . . . You have the capability, and you realize every
other [person] sitting around the table has the same capability but they don’t
do it. So somebody has to be the first.” Id.
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